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 Howard Kunreuther
 Reducing Losses from
 Catastrophic Risks through
 Long-Term Insurance and
 Mitigation
 RECENT CHANGES IN THE IMPACTS OF EXTREME EVENTS
 Increases in Economic and Insured Losses
 The economic and insured losses from natural disasters have
 increased significantly in recent years, as shown in figure 1 (each verti-
 cal bar represents the total economic losses, the darker zone repre-
 sents the insured portion of it)/ A comparison of these economic losses
 over time reveals a huge increase: $53.6 billion (1950-59), $93.3 billion
 (1960-69), $161.7 billion (1970-79), $262.9 billion (1980-89), and $778.3
 billion (1990-99). The current decade has already seen $420.6 billion in
 losses, principally due to the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, which
 produced historic records.
 Catastrophes have had a more devastating impact on insurers
 over the past 15 years than in the entire history of insurance. Between
 1970 and the mid-1980s, annual insured losses from natural disasters
 (including forest fires) were in the $3 billion to $4 billion range. The
 insured losses from Hurricane Hugo that made landfall in Charleston,
 South Carolina on September 22, 1989 exceeded $4 billion (in 1989
 prices). It was the first natural disaster to inflict more than $1 billion
 of insured losses in the United States. There was a radical increase
 in insured losses in the early 1990s with Hurricane Andrew (1992) in
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 Figure 1. Evolution of "Great Natural Catastrophes" Worldwide,
 1950-2007: Economic Versus Insured Impact
 Great natural disasters 1950 ± 2007
 Overall and insured losses
 Sources: Data from Munich Re; 2008 Geo Risks Research. In billions of US dollars, indexed to 2007.
 Florida ($23.7 billion in 2007 dollars) and the Northridge earthquake
 (1994) in California ($19.6 billion in 2007 dollars). The four hurricanes
 in Florida in 2004 (Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne) taken together
 cost insurers almost $33 billion. Insured and reinsured losses from
 Hurricane Katrina, which made landfall in the United States in August
 2005, are now estimated at $46 billion; total losses paid by private
 insurers due to major natural catastrophes were $87 billion in 2005.
 Figure 2 depicts the upward trend in worldwide insured losses from
 catastrophes between 1970 and 2007 (in 2007 indexed prices; corrected
 for inflation).
 Table 1 reveals the 20 most costly catastrophes for the insurance
 sector since 1970 (in 2007 dollars). Several observations are relevant
 here. First, 18 of the 20 most costly events have occurred since 1990.
 Hurricane Andrew and the Northridge earthquake were the first two
 906 social research
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 Figure 2. Worldwide Evolution of Catastrophe Insured Losses,
 1970-2007
 Note: For 9/11, all lines, including property and business interruption (BI). All figures are in billions
 of US dollars, indexed to 2007.
 Source: Wharton Risk Center, with data from Swiss Re and Insurance Information Institute.
 disasters that the industry experienced where losses were greater than
 $10 billion (designated as "super-cats") and caused insurers to reflect
 on whether risks from natural disasters were insurable. To assist
 them in making this determination, many firms began using catas-
 trophe models to estimate the likelihood and consequences to their
 insured portfolios from specific disasters in hazard-prone areas (Grossi
 and Kunreuther, 2005). With the exception of the terrorist attacks on
 September 11, 2001, all of the events in the top 20 were natural disas-
 ters. More than 80 percent of these were weather-related events: hurri-
 canes and typhoons, storms, and floods, with nearly three-quarters of
 the claims in the United States.
 Losses due to natural catastrophes and man-made disasters were
 far below the long-term trend in 2006. Of the $48 billion in catastro-
 Reducing Losses from Catastrophic Risks 907
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 Table 1. The 20 Most Costly Insured Catastrophes in the World,
 1970-20071
 Victims
 (Dead or Area of Primary
 Cost* Event Missing) Year Damage
 $46.3 Hurricane Katrina 1,836 2005 USA, Gulf of Mexico
 35.5 9/11 Attacks 3,025 2001 USA
 23.7 Hurricane Andrew 43 1992 USA, Bahamas
 Northridge
 19.6 Earthquake 61 1994 USA
 14.1 Hurricane Ivan 124 2004 USA, Caribbean
 13.3 Hurricane Wilma 35 2005 USA, Gulf of Mexico
 10.7 Hurricane Rita 34 2005 USA, Gulf of Mexico
 8.8 Hurricane Charley 24 2004 USA, Caribbean
 8.6 Typhoon Mireille 51 1991 Japan
 7.6 Hurricane Hugo 71 1989 Puerto Rico, USA
 7.4 Winterstorm Daria 95 1990 France, UK
 7.2 Winterstorm Lothar 110 1999 France, Switzerland
 6.1 Winterstorm Kyrill 54 2007 Germany, UK, NL, France
 5.7 Storms and Floods 22 1987 France, UK
 5.6 Hurricane Frances 38 2004 USA, Bahamas
 5.0 Winterstorm Vivian 64 1990 Western/Central Europe
 5.0 Typhoon Bart 26 1999 Japan
 4.5 Hurricane Georges 600 1998 USA, Caribbean
 4.2 Tropical Storm Alison 41 2001 USA
 4.2 Hurricane Jeanne 3,034 2004 USA, Caribbean
 •In billions of dollars. Indexed to 2007.
 Sources: Wharton Risk Center with data from Swiss Re and Insurance Information Institute.
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 phe-related economic losses, $16 billion was covered by insurance ($11
 billion for natural disasters; $5 billion for man-made). Over the past 20
 years, only two had insured losses lower than in 2006 (1988 and 1997)
 (Swiss Re, 2007). According to Munich Re, 950 natural catastrophes
 occurred in 2007, the most since 1974. They inflicted nearly $27 billion
 in insured losses.
 Increased Development in Hazard-Prone Areas2
 During the period between 1970 and 2004, storms and floods have
 been responsible for over 90 percent of the total economic costs of
 extreme weather-related events worldwide. Storms (hurricanes in
 North America, typhoons in Asia, and windstorms in Europe) contrib-
 ute to over 75 percent of insured losses. In constant prices (2004),
 insured losses from weather-related events averaged $3 billion annually
 between 1970 and 1990 and then increased significantly to $16 billion
 annually between 1990 and 2004 (Association of British Insurers, 2005).
 In 2005, 99.7 percent of all catastrophic losses worldwide were due to
 weather-related events (Mills and Lecomte, 2006).
 There are at least two principal socioeconomic factors that directly
 influence the level of economic losses due to catastrophe events: degree
 of urbanization and value at risk. In 1950, approximately 30 percent of
 the world's population lived in cities. In 2000, about 50 percent of the
 world's population (6 billion) resided in urban areas. Projections by the
 United Nations show that by 2025, that figure will have increased to 60
 percent based on a world population estimate of 8.3 billion people.
 In hazard-prone areas, this urbanization and increase of popu-
 lation also translates into increased concentration of exposure. The
 development of Florida as a home for retirees is an example. According
 to the US Bureau of the Census, the population of Florida has increased
 significantly over the past 50 years: 2.8 million inhabitants in 1950, 6.8
 million in 1970, 13 million in 1990, and a projected 19.3 million popu-
 lation in 2010 (almost a 700 percent increase since 1950), increasing the
 likelihood of severe economic and insured losses unless cost-effective
 mitigation measures are implemented.
 Reducing Losses from Catastrophic Risks 909
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 Figure 3. Insured Coastal Exposure as a Percentage of
 Statewide Insured Exposure (Residential and Commercial
 Properties) (December 2004).
 Florida ^WB^^WM^^^^^^^^M 79-3
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 0 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
 Source: Data from AIR Worldwide.
 Florida also has a high density of insurance coverage, with
 most houses covered against windstorm losses and about one-
 third insured against floods under the US National Flood Insurance
 Program (NFIP),3 according to a study undertaken by Munich Re
 (2000). The modeling firm AIR Worldwide estimates that nearly
 80 percent of insured assets in Florida today are located near the
 coasts, the high-risk area in the state (see figure 3). This represents
 $1.9 trillion of insured exposure located in coastal areas (see figure
 4). Insurance density is thus another critical socioeconomic factor
 to consider when evaluating the evolution of insured loss due to
 weather-related catastrophes.4
 These factors will continue to have a major impact on the level
 of insured losses from natural catastrophes. Given the growing concen-
 tration of exposure on the Gulf coast, if another hurricane like Katrina
 910 social research
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 Figure 4. Total Value of Insured Coastal Exposure as of December
 2004, Residential and Commercial Properties
 (in billions of dollars)
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 Source: Data from AIR Worldwide.
 were to hit the Gulf coast, it would likely inflict significant direct losses
 (property damage) and indirect losses (business interruption) unless
 strong mitigation measures are put in place beforehand.
 CHALLENGES IN USING MITIGATION TO REDUCE FUTURE
 LOSSES
 We undertook an analysis of four states (Florida, New York, South
 Carolina, and Texas) to determine the impact of mitigation on reducing
 losses from hurricanes of different intensities to residential homes. Data
 on each state's residential-only exposure to hurricane risk was provided
 by Risk Management Solutions (RMS). Losses are comprised of damage
 caused by the wind to buildings, contents, as well as victims' additional
 living expenses (ALE). Our analyses in New York, South Carolina, and
 Texas were performed looking at both the wind and storm surge peril
 Reducing Losses from Catastrophic Risks 911
This content downloaded from 130.91.116.52 on Wed, 22 Jun 2016 21:22:33 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 using the RMS hurricane industry exposure database. The RMS analyses
 in Florida did not include storm surge damage from hurricanes due to
 wind, so the Florida figures underestimate the damages relative to the
 other three states.
 RMS also provided data on the losses assuming full mitigation
 of the structures without determining whether each of the measures
 was cost effective. In New York, South Carolina, and Texas, we assumed
 that all houses and buildings were built to the latest standard. In
 Florida, we assumed that the relevant homes met the building codes
 for the Fortified ... for Safer Living program.5 These building codes are
 directed only at wood-frame or masonry dwellings, which comprise 80
 percent of the residential structures in the state, and include mitiga-
 tion measures such as roof anchors.
 Table 2 details the differences in losses for hurricanes with return
 periods of 100, 250, and 500 years for each of the four states we are
 studying if these loss-reduction measures were in place. The analyses
 reveal that mitigation has the potential for very significant cost savings
 in all four states, ranging from 61 percent in Florida for a 100-year
 hurricane to 31 percent in New York for a 500-year event.
 The Natural Disaster Syndrome
 Recent extreme events have highlighted the challenges associated with
 reducing losses from hurricanes and other natural hazards due to what
 I have termed the natural disaster syndrome (Kunreuther, 1996). Many
 homeowners, private businesses, and the public sector do not volun-
 tarily adopt cost-effective loss-reduction measures. Hence, the area is
 highly vulnerable and unprepared should a severe hurricane or other
 natural disaster occur. The magnitude of the destruction following a
 catastrophe often leads government agencies to provide disaster relief
 to victims even if prior to the event the government claimed that it
 had no intention of doing so. This combination of underinvestment in
 protection prior to the catastrophic event, together with the general
 taxpayer financing some of the recovery, can be critiqued on both effi-
 ciency and equity grounds.
 912 social research
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 Table 2. Money Saved from Full Mitigation for Different Return
 Periods
 100-Year Event
 Savings Savings
 from from
 State Unmitigated Losses Mitigation Mitigation (%)
 FL $84 bn $51 bn 61%
 NY $6 bn $2 bn 39%
 SC $4bn $2bn 44%
 TX $17 bn
 Savings Savings
 from from
 State Unmitigated Losses Mitigation Mitigation (%)
 FL $126 bn
 NY $13 bn $5bn 37%
 SC $7bn $3bn 41%
 TX $27 bn $9 bn 32%
 500-Year Event
 Savings from Savings from
 State Unmitigated Losses Mitigation ($) Mitigation (%)
 FL $160 bn $83 bn 52%
 NY $19 bn $7bn 35%
 SC $9bn $4bn 39%
 TX $37 bn $12 bn 31%
 One of the reasons for the natural disaster syndrome is due to the
 decision-making processes of individuals with respect to events such
 as a Category 3 or 4 hurricane or a major earthquake. Prior to a disas-
 ter, many individuals perceive its likelihood as sufficiently low that
 they argue, "It will not happen to me." As a result, they do not feel the
 need to invest voluntarily in protective measures, such as strengthen-
 Reducing Losses from Catastrophic Risks 913
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 ing their house or buying insurance. It is only after the disaster occurs
 that these same individuals express remorse that they didn't undertake
 protective measures.
 Another reason that individuals do not invest in protective
 measures is that they are extremely myopic and tend to focus on the
 returns only over the next couple of years. In addition, there is exten-
 sive experimental evidence showing that human temporal discounting
 tends to be hyperbolic, where temporally distant events are dispro-
 portionately discounted relative to immediate ones. As an example,
 people are willing to pay more to have the timing of the receipt of a
 cash prize accelerated from tomorrow to today, than from two days
 from now to tomorrow (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1991). The implication
 of hyperbolic discounting for mitigation decisions is that we are asking
 residents to invest a tangible fixed sum now to achieve a benefit later
 that we instinctively undervalue - and one that we, paradoxically, hope
 never to see at all. The effect of placing too much weight on immediate
 considerations is that the upfront costs of mitigation will loom dispro-
 portionately large relative to the delayed expected benefits in losses
 over time.
 There is extensive evidence that residents in hazard-prone areas
 do not undertake loss-prevention measures voluntarily. A 1974 survey
 of more than 1,000 California homeowners in earthquake-prone areas
 revealed that only 12 percent of the respondents had adopted any
 protective measures (Kunreuther et al., 1978). Fifteen years later, there
 was little change despite the increased public awareness of the earth-
 quake hazard. In a 1989 survey of 3,500 homeowners in four California
 counties at risk from earthquakes, only 5 to 9 percent of the respon-
 dents in these areas reported adopting any loss reduction measures.
 Palm et al. (1990), Burby et al. (1988), and Laska (1991) have found a
 similar reluctance by residents in flood-prone areas to invest in mitiga-
 tion measures.
 In the case of flood damage, Burby (2006) provides compelling
 evidence that actions taken by the federal government, such as building
 914 social research
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 levees, make residents feel safe when, in fact, they are still targets for
 catastrophes should the levee be breached or overtopped. This problem
 is reinforced by local public officials who do not enforce building codes
 or impose land-use regulations to restrict development in high hazard
 areas. If developers do not design homes to be resistant to disasters
 and individuals do not voluntarily adopt mitigation measures, one can
 expect large-scale losses following a catastrophic event, as evidenced by
 the property damage to New Orleans caused by Hurricane Katrina.
 Even after the devastating 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, a
 large number of residents had still not invested in relatively inexpen-
 sive loss-reduction measures with respect to their property, nor had
 they undertaken emergency preparedness measures.
 A survey of 1,100 adults living along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts
 undertaken in May 2006 revealed that 83 percent of the responders had
 not taken steps to fortify their home, 68 percent did not have a hurri-
 cane survival kit, and 60 percent did not have a family disaster plan
 (Goodnough, 2006).
 THE ROLE OF INSURANCE IN ENCOURAGING MITIGATION
 Given the significant increase in damage from hurricanes and other
 natural disasters during the past 15 years because of the growing popu-
 lation and assets in high-risk areas, we need a new approach so prop-
 erty owners undertake effective mitigation measures. In addition to
 well-enforced building codes there is a role that insurance can play to
 encourage the adoption of these measures and overcome the "it will
 not happen to me" and hyberbolic discount rate biases discussed in
 the previous section. Two principles should guide the development of
 insurance programs for reducing future losses and allocating the costs
 of disasters in an efficient and equitable manner.
 Principle 1 - Premiums Reflecting Risk: Insurance premiums should
 be based on risk to provide signals to individuals as to the hazards
 they face and to encourage them to engage in cost-effective mitigation
 measures to reduce their vulnerability to catastrophes.
 Reducing Losses from Catastrophic Risks 915
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 Principle 2 - Dealing with Equity and Affordability Issues: Any special
 treatment given to residents in hazard-prone areas (for example, low-
 income homeowners) should come from general public funding and
 not through insurance premium subsidies.
 Principle 1 is important because its application would provide
 a clear signal of relative damage to those currently residing in areas
 subject to natural disasters and those who are considering moving
 into these regions. Risk-based premiums also enable insurers to
 provide discounts to homeowners and businesses who invest in cost-
 effective loss-reduction mitigation measures. If insurers are required
 to charge artificially low premiums, they have no economic incentive
 to offer these discounts. In fact, they prefer not to offer coverage to
 these property owners because it is a losing proposition in the long-
 run.
 Principle 2 reflects a concern for some residents in hazard-prone
 areas who will be faced with large premium increases if insurers are
 permitted to adhere to Principle 1. Today, regulations imposed by
 state insurance commissioners keep premiums artificially lower than
 the risk-based level in many regions subject to hurricane damage. If
 insurers charge risk-based premiums, homeowners residing in hurri-
 cane-prone areas would pay considerably more for coverage than they
 currently do.
 Risk-Based Rates
 The first step in developing an insurance program that would adhere to
 Principle 1 is to estimate the risk-based rates that would apply to differ-
 ent regions of the country. Catastrophe models have been developed
 that evaluate the expected losses from hurricanes, earthquakes, and
 floods, using data from experts to estimate the likelihood of damages
 resulting from disasters of different magnitudes and intensities.
 Although there is uncertainty surrounding the estimates from these
 catastrophe models, they have been widely used by insurers and rein-
 surers to price the risk.
 916 social research
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 To enable insurers to charge risk-based premiums, regula-
 tors should stay out of the rate-setting business. If one allows a truly
 competitive market to operate, then insurers would not engage in
 price-gouging since they would be undercut by another company that
 profitably markets policies at a lower price. Regulators would still have
 an important role to play in other aspects of the insurance operation by
 making certain that insurers have sufficient surplus to protect unsus-
 pecting consumers against the possibility of their becoming insolvent
 following the next severe disaster.
 Affordability of Coverage
 The second step in the process relates to the affordability and equity
 issues indicated in Principle 2. To begin with, it would be critical to
 measure where and for whom affordability is truly a challenge and
 whether other individuals residing in these areas (for example, those
 providing valuable goods and services to other parts of the country)
 deserve a subsidy.
 To assist these individuals, we recommend that some type of
 insurance voucher be provided by the state or federal government. This
 type of in-kind assistance (rather than an unrestricted grant) assures
 that the recipients use the funds for obtaining insurance. If this system
 were applied to a family in a hazard-prone area, it would pay an insur-
 ance premium that reflects risk, and then be reimbursed by the state
 for a portion of the increased cost of insurance over the prior year's
 policy. The amount of reimbursement could be determined by their
 income and the risk-based insurance premium that they are charged.
 Several existing programs could serve as models for developing
 such a voucher system.
 Food Stamp Program. Under the food stamp program, a family is
 given vouchers to purchase food based on its annual income and size
 of the family. The idea for the program was born in the late 1930s,
 revived as a pilot program in 1961, and extended nationwide in 1974.
 The current program structure was implemented in 1977 with a goal of
 Reducing Losses from Catastrophic Risks 917
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 alleviating hunger and malnutrition by permitting low-income house-
 holds to obtain a more nutritious diet through normal purchasing of
 food from grocery stores. Food stamps are available to most low-income
 households with limited resources regardless of age, disability status, or
 family structure.6 The program is funded entirely by the federal govern-
 ment. Federal and state governments share administrative costs (with
 the federal government contributing nearly 50 percent). In 2003, total
 federal food stamp costs were nearly $24 billion. As of June 2007, more
 than 26 million individuals benefit from this program (Food Research
 and Action Center, 2007).
 low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP). The mission of
 this program is to assist low-income households that pay a high propor-
 tion of their income for home energy in meeting their immediate energy
 needs. The funding is provided by the federal government but is admin-
 istered by the states and federally recognized tribes or insular areas
 (Guam, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, for example) to help eligible low-
 income homeowners and renters meet their heating or cooling needs
 (eligibility based on similar criteria than the food stamp program).7 The
 federal government became involved in awarding energy assistance
 funds to low-income households program as a result of the increase
 in oil prices resulting from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
 Countries (OPEC) oil embargo in 1973. Over the past few years, the
 annual appropriation of this program has averaged $2 billion.8
 Universal Service Fund (USF).9 The USF was created by the Federal
 Communications Commission in 1997 to ensure that consumers in all
 regions of the country have access to telecommunications services that
 are reasonably priced relative to those in urban areas. To achieve this
 goal, the USF provides discounts to low-income individuals in high-
 cost rural areas, and to other special groups, such as rural health care
 providers, schools, and libraries in those areas. All telecommunication
 carriers that provide service internationally and between states pay
 contributions into the USF. The carriers may build this factor into their
 billing systems if they choose to recoup this amount from their custom-
 918 social research
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 ers. The USF provides discounts that make basic, local telephone service
 affordable to more than 7 million low-income consumers. From 1998 to
 2006, over $50 billion has been disbursed by this fund.
 Who Should Subsidize Insurance?
 The above programs use different methods to subsidize low-income
 families for specific goods and services. With respect to homeown-
 ers insurance, there are several different ways that vouchers could be
 provided that mirror these programs.
 General Taxpayer. If one takes the position that everyone in soci-
 ety is responsible for assisting those who reside in hazard-prone areas,
 then one could utilize general taxpayer revenue from the federal
 government to cover the costs of insurance vouchers. This is what is
 currently done by the food stamp program and the low-income home
 energy assistance program.
 State Government. An alternative (or complementary) source of
 funding would come from taxes on residents and/or commercial enter-
 prises in the state exposed to natural disaster. One argument that could
 be made for this type of funding arrangement is that states obtain
 significant financial benefits from economic development in their juris-
 dictions through the collection of property taxes or other state revenue
 such as gasoline taxes, state income taxes, and sales taxes. If residents
 in coastal areas receive greater benefits from the economic develop-
 ment in these regions than others in the state, they should be taxed
 proportionately more than those residing inland.
 Insurance Policyholders. A special tax could be levied on all insur-
 ance policyholders for covering the costs of these vouchers. The ratio-
 nale for this type of tax would be that all homeowners (as opposed to
 all taxpayers) should be responsible for helping to protect those who
 cannot afford protection or should be subsidized for other reasons. The
 justification for such a program would be similar to the rationale for
 establishing the USF for telecommunication service: providing afford-
 able telephone service to all residents in the country.
 Reducing Losses from Catastrophic Risks 919
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 LONG-TERM HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE10
 Need for Long-Term Insurance
 Based on the principle of risk-based rates, insurers should consider
 marketing long-term insurance contracts on residential property as a
 way of providing stability to homeowners and encouraging adoption
 of cost-effective mitigation measures. There is precedent for long-term
 contracts in insurance - Benjamin Franklin created the Philadelphia
 Contributionship for the Insuring of Houses from Fire in 1752. It even-
 tually became the Green Tree Mutual Assurance Company, which closed
 its doors in 2004.11
 Short-term insurance policies create significant social costs.
 Evidence from recent disasters reveals that many consumers fail
 to adequately protect their homes or even insure at all, creating a
 welfare cost to themselves and a possible cost to all taxpayers in the
 form of government disaster assistance. To illustrate, the Department
 of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) reported that 41 percent of
 damaged homes from the 2005 hurricanes were uninsured or underin-
 sured. Of the 60,196 owner-occupied homes with severe wind damage
 from these hurricanes, 23,000 (38 percent) did not have insurance
 against wind loss (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007).
 The absence of long-term insurance (LTI) also results in direct
 private costs to both the insurer and the insured. The private value
 of the LTI over a period of N years is higher than the sum of N one-
 year insurance contracts if the risk remains constant over time for two
 reasons: 1) LTI reduces the transaction costs to consumers should their
 annual homeowners policy not be renewed and to insurers should
 homeowners cancel their policy, and 2) an LTI reduces the uncertainty
 to homeowners as to whether their premiums will be significantly
 increased following a severe disaster.
 For a long-term insurance policy to be feasible (say, 10 or 25 years),
 insurers would have to be able to charge a rate that reflects their best
 estimate of the risk over that time period (Principle 1). The uncertainty
 surrounding these estimates could be reflected in the premium as a
 920 social research
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 function of the length of the insurance contract, in much the same way
 that the interest rate on fixed-rate mortgages varies between 15-, 25-,
 and 30-year loans. Insurance vouchers could be provided to homeown-
 ers who cannot afford coverage at risk-based rates (Principle 2).
 The obvious advantage of a long-term insurance contract from
 the point of view of policyholders is that it provides them with stabil-
 ity and an assurance that their property is protected for as long as they
 own it. This has been a major concern in hazard-prone areas where
 insurers have cancelled policies following severe disasters such as those
 that occurred during the 2005 hurricane season.
 Encouraging Adoption of Mitigation Measures
 Long-term insurance also provides economic incentives for investing
 in mitigation where current annual insurance policies (even if they are
 risk-based) are unlikely to do the trick due to the behavioral consid-
 erations discussed in the previous section. To highlight this point,
 consider the following simple example. Suppose a family could invest
 $1,500 to strengthen the roof of its house so as to reduce the damage
 by $30,000 from a future hurricane with an annual probability of 1/100.
 An insurer charging a risk-based premium would be willing to reduce
 the annual charge by $300 (that is, 1/100 x $30,000) to reflect the lower
 expected losses that would occur if a hurricane hit the area in which
 the policyholder was residing. If the house was expected to last for 10 or
 more years, the net present value of the expected benefit of investing in
 this measure would exceed the upfront cost at an annual discount rate
 as high as 15 percent.
 Under current annual insurance contracts, many property
 owners would be reluctant to incur the $1,500 because they would get
 only $300 back next year. If they underweight the future, the expected
 discounted benefits would likely be less than their $1,500 upfront costs.
 In addition, budget constraints could discourage them from investing
 in the mitigation measure. Other considerations would also play a role
 in a family's decision not to invest in these measures: the family may be
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 uncertain as to how long they will reside in the area or whether their
 insurer would reward them again when their policy is renewed.
 A 20-year required insurance policy ties the contract to the prop-
 erty rather than to the individual. In fact, the homeowner could obtain
 a $1,500 home improvement loan tied to the mortgage at an annual
 interest rate of 10 percent, resulting in payments of $145 per year. If
 the insurance premium was reduced by $300, the savings to the home-
 owner each year would be $155. Alternatively, this loan could be incor-
 porated as part of the mortgage at a lower interest rate.
 A bank would have a financial incentive to provide this type of
 loan. By linking the mitigation expenditures to the structure rather than
 to the current property owner, the annual payments would be lower
 and this would be a selling point to mortgagees. The bank would be
 more fully protected against a catastrophic loss to the property, and the
 insurer's potential loss from a major disaster would be reduced. These
 mitigation loans would constitute a new financial product. Moreover,
 the general public will now be less likely to have large amounts of their
 tax dollars going for disaster relief. A win-win-win situation for all!
 (Kunreuther, 2006)
 There is an additional benefit to insurers in having banks
 encourage individuals to invest in cost-effective mitigation
 measures. The costs of reinsurance, which protects insurers against
 catastrophic losses, should now decrease. If reinsurers know that
 they are less likely to make large payments to insurers because each
 piece of property in a region now has a lower chance of experienc-
 ing a large loss, then they will reduce their premiums to the insurer
 for the same reason that the insurer is reducing its premium to the
 property owner.
 Suppose that an insurer had 1,000 identical insurance policies
 in the area in which the above family lived, and each one would have
 a claims payment of $40,000 following a hurricane if homes had not
 strengthened their roofs. The insurer's loss from such a disaster would
 be $40 million. Suppose that the insurer wants to have $25 million in
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 coverage from a reinsurer to protect its surplus. If the hypothetical
 hurricane has a 1 in 100 chance of hitting the region where these fami-
 lies reside, the expected loss to a reinsurer would be $250,000 and the
 premium charged to the insurer would reflect this. If the bank required
 that all 1,000 homes have their roofs fortified to meet the local building
 code and each homeowner's loss were reduced to $10,000, then insur-
 er's total loss would be $10 million should all 1,000 homes be affected,
 and it would not require reinsurance. This savings would be passed on
 by the insurer in the form of a lower premium.
 Open Questions for Designing Long-Term Insurance Contracts
 A number of issues and questions associated with the development of a
 long-term insurance policy have a direct impact on insurers and home-
 owners, and indirect effects on other stakeholders, that require further
 research and analysis. Some of the issues that need to be resolved
 include:
 Nature of the Contract: Long-term insurance could be offered by
 insurers in the form of a fixed-price contract (FPC) for the full term of
 the policy (for example, 20 years) or an adjustable premium contract
 (APC) at a variable premium with guaranteed renewal for the term of
 the policy. The annual premium would be reset based on an index that
 would have to be simple and transparent. Policyholders will want the
 option to terminate the contract; mortgage markets provide examples
 of both good and bad practices. On FPCs, formal arrangements may
 be necessary to make the insurer whole through provisions such as
 yield maintenance and defeasance (the two most common methods for
 dealing with prepayment costs on commercial mortgages). On APCs,
 the borrower would want the right to terminate the contract within
 a certain time period of a premium increase notification, such as 3
 months.
 Protection Against Catastrophic Losses: One would also need to know
 how the rating agencies will view long-term FPC commitments, since
 the insurer is now locked into the premium even if the expected losses
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 rise. To protect itself against possible increases in the probability of
 catastrophic losses over time, insurers marketing FPCs would have to
 be able to invest in cat bonds or other forms of securitized risks. Some
 type of government guarantee might be necessary to deal with both
 insurers' and policyholders' concerns with respect to the ability to pay
 claims in the future following a catastrophic loss. As for the pricing of
 the product, FPC premiums would likely be somewhat higher than APC
 premiums to protect insurers against an increase in the risk during the
 contract period. This behavior would be similar to the pricing of fixed-
 rate mortgages relative to adjustable rate mortgages.
 One of the central issues will be how high the price of a long-term
 contract will be, given the ambiguities associated with the risk and the
 capital costs for covering catastrophic losses. Without some type of
 protection against large losses either through long-term risk transfer
 instruments (which currently do not exist) or a government reinsur-
 ance program at the state or federal level, the premiums for FPCs are
 likely to be extremely high so that there would be little demand for this
 type of coverage.
 Understanding the Contract: Those who purchase insurance policies
 often have a difficult time understanding every aspect of the terms of the
 contract - what risks are covered, what risks are not, and the basis for
 being charged a specific rate. The problem is likely to be compounded
 for a long-term insurance contract. There is an opportunity for insur-
 ers to educate consumers as to the basis for the premiums they charge
 by providing more detail on the types of risks that are covered and the
 amount charged for different levels of protection. More specifically,
 insurers could break down the premium into coverage against fire, theft,
 wind damage, and other losses included in a homeowners policy, and
 how the premium varied with the length of the long-term contract.
 It would be beneficial for insurers to reveal this information so
 that homeowners will be able to make better decisions by understand-
 ing the nature of the contract and what alternative options cost them.
 They will then be able to make trade-offs between costs and expected
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 benefits, which is impossible for them to do today. Thaler and Sunstein
 (2008) argue for this type of information disclosure by proposing a
 form of government regulation termed RECAP (Record, Evaluate, and
 Compare Alternative Prices). They recommend that the government
 not regulate prices but require disclosure practices - not in a long,
 unintelligible document, but in a spreadsheet-like format that includes
 all relevant formulas.
 Requiñnglnsurance Coverage: One needs to consider whether insur-
 ance should be required on all residential property. This would not be
 a radical change from the current situation - homeowners who have
 a mortgage are normally required by the bank that finances the loan
 to purchase coverage against wind damage for the length of the mort-
 gage. Similarly, those in flood-prone areas are required to purchase
 flood insurance under the National Flood Insurance Program if they
 have a federally insured mortgage. Insurance coverage is required
 today for other consumer purchases. Today in all states motorists
 must show proof of financial responsibility on their automobile insur-
 ance policy for bodily injury and property damage liability in order to
 register their car.
 If all homes were required to purchase a homeowners policy it
 would enable insurers to more easily diversify their risks and hence
 reduce the likelihood of suffering catastrophic losses over the length of
 the long-term contract. Another advantage of requiring homeowners
 insurance is that it will reduce the likelihood of liberal disaster assis-
 tance following the next large-scale disaster since victims will have
 financial protection.
 Whether long-term insurance will be attractive to insurers,
 homeowners, regulators, and other relevant stakeholders will certainly
 depend on the market conditions that come with it. What is clear today,
 however, is that we need innovative programs for reducing future
 losses from disasters that involve combined strengths of the public and
 private sectors. For insurance to play an important role in this regard,
 one needs to understand what a policy can and cannot do as a function
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 of the nature of the risk, the type of coverage provided by the insurer
 and the premium structure.
 THE BENEFITS OF MITIGATION
 We can summarize the conclusions that emerge from this paper with
 the following points:
 ► The losses from natural disasters have increased significantly in
 the past 15 years, and we as a society are more vulnerable to cata-
 strophic losses in future years than we have been in the past.
 ► A principal reason for these increased losses is the continuing
 economic development in hazard-prone areas. The development
 of Florida highlights this point: the projected population in Florida
 in 2010 will be 19.3 million - a 700 percent increase over the 2.8
 million inhabitants residing in the state in 1950.
 ► By mitigating existing and new homes with structural measures
 (for example, better designed roofs) one could reduce future disas-
 ter losses significantly. If all residential homes in Florida were fully
 mitigated, the damage from a 100-year hurricane would be reduced
 from $84 billion to $33 billion, a decrease of 61 percent.
 ► Individuals are reluctant to invest in cost-effective mitigation for
 many reasons, including an underestimation of the risk, a focus on
 short-term returns, and budget constraints.
 ► Insurance provides an opportunity to reward individuals who
 undertake mitigation measures by offering discounts on insurance
 premiums. For insurers to want to provide these premium reduc-
 tions they need to be able to charge risk-based rates. If one wants
 to subsidize some homeowners in hazard-prone areas (low-income
 residents), vouchers should come from sources outside of insurance
 using models such as the food stamp program.
 ► Long-term insurance tied to the property rather than to the
 individual provides financial stability to individuals residing in
 hazard-prone areas and should lead to the adoption of cost-effective
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 mitigation measures that would normally not be adopted under
 annual insurance policies. Such a program raises a number of ques-
 tions for future research.
 NOTES
 * This paper incorporates material from a study on Managing Large-
 Scale Risks in a New Era of Catastrophes (Wharton Risk Management
 and Decision Processes Center in conjunction with Georgia State
 University and the Insurance Information Institute, March 2008)
 and Kunreuther (2008). It reflects many helpful discussions with
 my colleagues on the project: Neil Doherty, Martin Grace, Robert
 Klein, Paul Kleindorfer, Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Mark Pauly, and Paul
 Raschky. Funding for the Wharton Risk Management and Decision
 Processes Center's "Managing and Financing Extreme Events" proj-
 ect is gratefully acknowledged.
 1. This table excludes payments for flood by the National Flood
 Insurance Program in the United States (for example, $17.3 billion in
 2005 as a result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita).
 2. This subsection is based on Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2007).
 3. Ine NMP is a public insurance program created in 1968. Under the
 program, insurers play the role of intermediaries between the poli-
 cyholders and the federal government. Following Hurricane Katrina,
 the program had to borrow $20 billion from the federal government
 in 2006 to meet its claims. Congress is considering modifying the
 program substantially.
 4. For additional data on the economic impact of future catastrophic
 hurricanes see the Financial Services Roundtable (2007).
 5. Information on this program is available on the website of the
 Institute for Business and Home Safety at <http://www.ibhs.org/prop-
 erty_protection/default.asp?id=8>.
 6. More details on this program are available at <http://www.frac.org/
 html/federal_food_programs/programs/fsp.html>.
 7. For instance, at the end of August 2007, Secretary of Health and
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 Human Services (HHS) Mike Leavitt announced that $50 million in
 emergency energy assistance would be given to 12 states that experi-
 enced much hotter than normal conditions during the summer.
 8. For more details on this program, see US Department of Health and
 Human Services at <http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/liheap/>.
 9. For more details on this program, see <http://www.usac.org/about/
 universal-service>.
 10. The material in this section is based on Jaffee, Kunreuther, and
 Michel-Kerjan (2008).
 11. The Philadelphia Contributionship and other perpetual insur-
 ance companies require a large fixed payment at the time that one
 purchases insurance. The interest earned on this "insurance invest-
 ment" covers the annual premiums on the property. We thank Felix
 Kloman for calling attention to this type of long-term insurance rela-
 tionship. Kloman has favored long-term commitments and partner-
 ships between the insurer and insured for many years, having written
 columns on the topic in his publication, Risk Management Reports, in
 September 1994 and October 1995.
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